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FROM CALDER TO MITCHELL: 
SHOULD THE COURTS PATROL 
CULTURAL BORDERS? 
Peter W. Hutchins* 
Anjali Choksi** 
In what sense is an era ever truly finished — who sets the boundaries and how are 
they patrolled. Do we not have overwhelming evidence, in our time and in every 
period we study of an odd interlayering of cultural perspectives and a mixing of 
peoples, so that nothing is ever truly complete or unitary.1 
The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.2 
... Constitutional protection of indigenous difference ought to extend beyond pro-
tection of certain customs, practices, and traditions integral to Aboriginal cultures 
to include protection of interests associated with territory, sovereignty, and the 
treaty process.3 
I.  INTRODUCTION — THE INITIAL VISION 
In Mitchell the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the judgments of two 
lower courts by (1) re-characterizing the right claimed by the plaintiff and (2) 
re-evaluating the evidence led by the plaintiff in support of this newly charac-
terized right.4 
Our analysis of the Mitchell decision focuses on four matters. What does the 
decision say about predictability and consistency in Aboriginal rights litigation? 
                                                                                                                                                              
* Peter W. Hutchins is a partner in the firm of Hutchins, Soroka & Dionne in Montreal and 
Hutchins, Soroka & Grant in Vancouver. 
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1 Gallagher and Greenblatt, Practicing New Historicism (2000) at 7. 
2 Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harv. L.R. 160, at 160 [hereinafter Holmes]. 
3 Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (2001) at 49. 
4 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [hereinafter Mitchell, SCC]. 
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What does the decision say about how the Van der Peet test5 is being applied? 
How does the rights discourse and analysis in Van der Peet, as argued by the 
Crown and applied by the Court in Mitchell, compare with the rights discourse 
which Canada and the provinces promote in negotiation of Aboriginal claims? 
And, finally, are there alternatives to the Van der Peet rights analysis which can 
be proposed? 
There are two seemingly contradictory forces at work in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Mitchell v. M.N.R.: 
 
• On one hand, it reflects the increasingly misguided attempts of the 
courts to impose judicial positivism on history and culture; 
• At the same time, it introduces further confusion and uncertainty into an 
area of law, crying out for certainty, by throwing into doubt the robust-
ness of established and developing judicial doctrine, including: 
• deference to the Trial Judge; 
• response to the pleadings as framed; 
• the role of the justification test in protecting society; and 
• the role of section 35 in reconciling Crown sovereignty and pre-
existing Aboriginal societies. 
 
Professor Mark Walters in his excellent paper entitled “The Right to Cross a 
River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” writes that: 
Within the space of three paragraphs in Mitchell the law of Aboriginal rights in 
Canada was reduced to doctrinal shambles.6 
In our view, damage has certainly been done. Before we examine the Court’s 
approach to Aboriginal/Crown relations and Aboriginal legal issues in the final 
decades of the 20th century and the dawning of the new millennium, it might be 
instructive to consider how the Court was dealing with these issues at the end 
of the Victorian period. As Chief Justice Dickson and La Forest J. pointed out 
in their reasons in Sparrow, in the earlier period, Aboriginal7 cases “were es-
sentially concerned with settling legislative jurisdiction or the rights of com-
mercial enterprises”.8 The people whose rights and interests were at stake were 
rarely, if ever, parties in court. In 1895, Sedgewick J. in In Re Indian Claims 
acknowledged this but went on to announce how our courts, with the consent of 
                                                                                                                                                              
5
  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [hereinafter Van der Peet]. 
6 Walters, “The Right to Cross a River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” prepared 
for the Toronto Conference of the Pacific Business and Law Institute, October 25, 2001, at 7 
[hereinafter Walters]. 
7 Or as the expression was at the time “Indian”. 
8 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1103 [hereinafter Sparrow]. 
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the Crown and of all of our governments, should approach “all questions be-
tween Her Majesty and ‘Her faithful Indian allies’”. He wrote: 
Another consideration has a bearing on the matter. The contest in this case is not 
between the Indians on the one hand and the Government on the other; it is in its 
last analysis a contest between Ontario and Quebec. The principle of generous con-
struction so ably and correctly pointed out by the learned Chancellor would very 
properly be applicable were it a case of the former kind. Had the rights of the Indi-
ans been in question here — were their claims to the increased annuity disputed — 
did that depend upon some difficult question of construction or upon some ambigu-
ity of language — courts should make every possible intendment in their favour 
and to that end. They would with the consent of the Crown and of all of our gov-
ernments strain to their utmost limit all ordinary rules of construction or principles 
of law — the governing motive being that in all questions between Her Majesty 
and “Her faithful Indian allies” there must be on her part, and on the part of those 
who represent her, not only good faith, but more, there must be not only justice, but 
generosity. The wards of the nation must have the fullest benefit of every possible 
doubt.9 
In the context of Mitchell, the reference to the Queen’s “faithful Indian al-
lies” is particularly poignant given the role of the Mohawks as crucial military 
forces and allies for the British during the French/British and British/American 
conflicts in North America through to the end of the War of 1812 and how this 
military tradition, so useful to the British for so long,10 was turned against them 
by the Supreme Court in Mitchell. Also of interest in the words of Sedgewick J. 
is the suggestion that there must be on the part of Her Majesty not only good 
faith, not only justice, but generosity. The latter quality is remarkably absent in 
the manner in which the Court re-characterized Chief Mitchell’s claim as ex-
pressed in the pleadings and reiterated in the evidence at trial. 
Two years later in St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, 
Strong J. in lengthy dissenting reasons (but not of this point) invoked once 
again the role of Indian Nations as faithful allies of the Crown and how this 
condition had been won through a system whereby the British recognized their 
rights to lands and guaranteed their protection in the possession and enjoyment 
of such lands. He wrote: 
That the more liberal treatment accorded to the Indians by this system of protecting 
them in the enjoyment of their hunting grounds and prohibiting settlement on lands 
which they had not surrendered, which it is now contended the British North Amer-
ica Act has put an end to, was successful in its results, is attested by the historical 
                                                                                                                                                              
9 [1895] 25 S.C.R. 434, at 534-35. 
10 See, for instance, Mitchell v. M.N.R., [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 103, at 157, 171-180 (F.C.T.D.) 
[hereinafter Mitchell Fed. Court].  
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fact that from the memorable year 1763, when Detroit was besieged and all the In-
dian tribes were in revolt, down to the date of confederation, Indian wars and mas-
sacres entirely ceased in the British possessions in North America, although 
powerful Indian nations still continued for some time after the former date to in-
habit those territories. That this peaceful conduct of the Indians is in a great degree 
to be attributed to the recognition of their rights to lands unsurrendered by them, 
and to the guarantee of their protection in the possession and enjoyment of such 
lands given by the crown in the proclamation of October, 1763, hereafter to be 
more fully noticed, is a well known fact of Canadian history which cannot be con-
troverted. The Indian nations from that time became and have since continued to be 
the firm and faithful allies of the crown and rendered it important military services 
in two wars — the war of the Revolution and that of 1812.11 
The Supreme Court’s current voyage of discovery on the matter of Aborigi-
nal title and rights can be said to have commenced with Calder in 1973.12 Al-
though Calder involved Aboriginal title, what we now refer to as a title case, it 
is instructive to see how the two justices writing the substantive reasons, Judson 
and Hall JJ., approached the matter of characterizing Aboriginal culture, in this 
particular case that of the Nisga’a Nation.  
The fact is that both justices appeared comfortable in characterizing the 
rights being claimed in general terms based upon the fact of Aboriginal occupa-
tion and were at pains to avoid as much as possible imposing narrow Western 
legal concepts. 
Justice Judson in an oft cited passage expressed the situation as follows: 
Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its 
origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indi-
ans were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers 
had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not help one in 
the solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary right”. What they 
are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on their lands 
as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extin-
guished. There can be no question that this right was “dependent on the goodwill of 
the Sovereign”.13 
Justice Hall, in quoting Frank Calder in cross-examination, appeared com-
fortable with the characterization of the right as asserted by the Nisga’a Nation: 
The nature of the title of the interest being asserted on behalf of the Nishgas was 
stated in evidence by Calder in cross-examination as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                              
11 (1887) 13 S.C.R. 577, at 609-610.  
12 Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter Calder]. 
13 Ibid., at 328. 
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From time immemorial the Naas River Nishga Indians possessed, occu-
pied and used the Naas Valley, Observatory Inlet, and Portland Inlet and 
Canal, and within this territory the Nishgas hunted in its woods, fished in 
its waters, streams and rivers. Roamed, hunted and pitched their tents in 
the valleys, shores and hillsides. Buried their dead in their homeland ter-
ritory. Exercised all the privileges of free men in the tribal territory. The 
Nishgas have never ceded or extinguished their aboriginal title within this 
territory.14 
In reviewing the jurisprudence both of the United States and the Common-
wealth, Hall J. noted the general characterization of the relationship between 
Indian Nations and the European newcomers preferred by the courts: 
The dominant and recurring proposition stated by Chief Justice Marshall in John-
son v. McIntosh is that on discovery or on conquest the aborigines of newly-found 
lands were conceded to be the rightful occupants of the soil with a legal as well as a 
just claim to retain possession of it and to use it according to their own discretion, 
but their rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations were necessarily 
diminished and their power to dispose of the soil on their own will to whomsoever 
they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that discovery or 
conquest gave exclusive title to those who made it.15 
Approximately 10 years after Calder, Dickson J. in Guerin had the occasion 
to review the Court’s earlier jurisprudence on Indian title and Indian interests in 
lands this time in the context of submissions regarding the legal character of the 
Crown’s fiduciary duty.16 
Once again, the majority of the Court, speaking through Dickson J., came to 
the conclusion that attempts at precise juridical characterization of the Indian 
interest was “both unnecessary and potentially misleading”. Justice Dickson 
wrote:  
It appears to me that there is no real conflict between the cases which character-
ize Indian title as a beneficial interest of some sort, and those which characterize it 
a personal, usufructuary right. Any apparent inconsistency derives from the fact 
that in describing what constitutes a unique interest in land the courts have almost 
inevitably found themselves applying a somewhat inappropriate terminology drawn 
from general property law. There is a core of truth in the way that each of the two 
lines of authority has described native title, but an appearance of conflict has none-
theless arisen because in neither case is the categorization quite accurate. 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 Ibid., at 351. 
15 Ibid., at 383. The so-called Marshall trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823), 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), estab-
lished the direction of U.S. Indian law. 
16 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
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... The nature of the Indians’ interest is therefore best characterized by its general 
inalienability, coupled with the fact that the Crown is under an obligation to deal 
with the land on the Indians’ behalf when the interest is surrendered. Any descrip-
tion of Indian title which goes beyond these two features is both unnecessary and 
potentially misleading.17 
With respect to the contradictions in the Court’s judgment in Mitchell to 
which we referred at the outset, what is curious is that the Chief Justice who 
wrote the majority reasons in Mitchell had previously, in her dissenting reasons 
in Van der Peet, appeared to question not only the legal positivism at work in 
the Court’s test but also the appropriateness of using certain cultural concepts 
as “the markers of legal rights”. 
On the first point, the Chief Justice quite rightly points out in her dissent in 
Van der Peet that the Court originally used the concept of integrality in a com-
pletely different context in Sparrow: 
... The governing concept of integrality comes from a description in the Sparrow 
case where the extent of the aboriginal right (to fish for food) was not seriously in 
issue. It was never intended to serve as a test for determining the extent of disputed 
exercises of aboriginal rights.18 
In another section of her dissenting reasons the Chief Justice takes a consid-
erably more flexible approach to determining whether modern practices consti-
tute Aboriginal rights than is apparent in her majority reasons in Mitchell: 
If a specific modern practice is treated as the right at issue, the analysis may be 
foreclosed before it begins. This is because the modern practice by which the more 
fundamental right is exercised may not find a counterpart in the aboriginal culture 
of two or three centuries ago. So if we ask whether there is an aboriginal right to a 
particular kind of trade in fish, i.e., large-scale commercial trade, the answer in 
most cases will be negative. On the other hand, if we ask whether there is an abo-
riginal right to use the fishery resource for the purpose of providing food, clothing 
or other needs, the answer may be quite different. Having defined the basic under-
lying right in general terms, the question then becomes whether the modern prac-
tice at issue may be characterized as an exercise of the right. 
This is how we reconcile the principle that aboriginal rights must be ancestral 
rights with the uncompromising insistence of this Court that aboriginal rights not 
be frozen. The rights are ancestral; they are the old rights that have been passed 
down from previous generations. The exercise of those rights, however, takes mod-
ern forms. To fail to recognize the distinction between rights and the contem-
porary form in which the rights are exercised is to freeze aboriginal societies 
                                                                                                                                                              
17 Ibid., at 382. 
18 Van der Peet, supra, note 5, at para. 255. 
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in their ancient modes and deny to them the right to adapt, as all peoples must, 
to the changes in the society in which they live. 
I share the concern of L’Heureux-Dubé J. that the Chief Justice defines the 
rights at issue with too much particularity, enabling him to find no aboriginal right 
where a different analysis might find one. By insisting that Mrs. Van der Peet’s 
modern practice of selling fish be replicated in pre-contact Sto:lo practices, he ef-
fectively condemns the Sto:lo to exercise their right precisely as they exercised it 
hundreds of years ago and precludes a finding that the sale constitutes the exercise 
of an aboriginal right.19 
With respect to the Court engaging in cultural analysis, the Chief Justice 
stated in her reasons in Van der Peet: 
The problem of overbreadth thus brings me to my second concern, the problem 
of indeterminacy. To the extent that one attempts to narrow the test proposed 
by the Chief Justice by the addition of concepts of distinctiveness, specificity 
and centrality, one encounters the problem that different people may entertain 
different ideas of what is distinctive, specific or central. To use such concepts 
as the markers of legal rights is to permit the determination of rights to be col-
oured by the subjective views of the decision-maker rather than objective 
norms, and to invite uncertainty and dispute as to whether a particular prac-
tice constitutes a legal right.20 
We suggest that if one focuses on the language highlighted in the preceding 
passages, one is presented with an approach to understanding and characteriz-
ing claims of Aboriginal title and rights that is considerably more liberal than 
the ultimate reasoning in Mitchell. They demonstrate a holistic and dynamic 
perspective both as to what Aboriginal societies once were and also as to what 
they have become. They suggest that the reconciliation so urged by the courts 
should involve not an act of reconciling contemporary non-Aboriginal society 
with a museum diorama approach to Aboriginal societies, to use Professor Brad 
Morse’s apt image,21 but rather with the contemporary and evolving Aboriginal 
societies which exist across this land. 
                                                                                                                                                              
19 Ibid., at paras. 239, 240, 241 (emphasis added). 
20 Ibid., at para. 257 (emphasis added). 
21 Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R. v. 
Pamajewon” (1997), 42 McGill L.J. 1011 [hereinafter Morse]. 
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II. PREDICTABILITY IN ABORIGINAL RIGHTS LITIGATION 
1.  Seeking Terra Firma 
The renowned American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, in his article entitled 
The Path of the Law discussed the object of the study of law in the following 
terms: 
When we study law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession. 
We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise 
people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profes-
sion, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in so-
cieties like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain 
cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out 
their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and 
how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than 
themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be 
feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence 
of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.22 
Justice Holmes concluded the passage above by identifying the object of the 
study of law as prediction and, in particular, prediction of the “incidence of the 
public force through the instrumentality of the Courts”. The area of the law 
applying to Aboriginal peoples is and has been a rapidly evolving one over the 
past decades. Chief Justice Lamer himself acknowledged this in Delgamuukw 
v. British Columbia.23 Mitchell represents at least a pause in this evolution, as 
well as a challenge to counsel and clients attempting what Holmes J. referred to 
as the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality 
of the courts. 
Professor Brian Slattery, who in a very real sense has been our medium in 
this area of law, published an article which he entitled Making Sense of Abo-
riginal and Treaty Rights. He introduced that article as follows: 
Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court of Canada has begun remapping the 
neglected territory of aboriginal and treaty rights. It has done so piecemeal, in a se-
ries of important decisions extending from Calder in 1973 to the recent Marshall 
case. When it started, the Court had little to go on. The results of previous forays 
into this territory had been uncertain at best and misleading at worst. The leading 
authority on the subject, the Privy Council decision in St. Catharine’s Milling and 
Lumber Company, was replete with dubious assumptions and obscure terminology. 
In effect, the Supreme Court inherited a sketch map of shadowy coasts and fabu-
lous isles, with monsters at every turn. 
                                                                                                                                                              
22 Holmes, supra, note 2, at 160.  
23 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 75, 79 and 159 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]. 
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Let it be said that the Supreme Court has fared well in its initial ventures. Little-
known areas have been brought to light and apocryphal seas dispelled. We now 
know broadly what is terra firma and what is not, and the monsters have been 
largely tamed or banished to the decorative margins. Nevertheless, the first fruits of 
the Court’s labours amount to a series of explorer’s charts, enlightening so far as 
they go, but covering different areas, drawn in varying projections, and sometimes 
bearing an uncertain relation to one another. We lack a reliable mappamundi. The 
purpose of this paper is to attempt such a map — one that surveys the subject as a 
whole and displays the various parts in their proper dimensions and inter-
relationships.24 
Now when Professor Slattery wrote those words, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada had not yet handed down its judgment in Mitchell v. M.N.R. Where would 
Professor Slattery place the Mitchell decision in his mappamundi? He states 
that: 
We now know broadly what is terra firma and what is not, and the monsters have 
been largely tamed or banished to the decorative margins.25  
After Mitchell one might be inclined to be sceptical. 
Professor Kent McNeil is less sanguine about the progress of our courts in 
charting the terra firma and banishing the monsters: 
Despite vacillations in policy from treaty acknowledgement of tribal sovereignty 
and land rights through removal, allotment, reorganization, termination and self-
determination, the doctrinal foundations of Indian law have been fairly well settled 
in the United States since the Marshall Court decisions of the 1820s and 1830s. Not 
so in Canada, where the courts are only beginning to address some major Aborigi-
nal rights issues. Prominent among these are the issue of the nature of Aboriginal 
rights to land (commonly known as Aboriginal title), and the question of whether 
the Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right of self-government.26 
Does Mitchell assist us in locating Professor Slattery’s terra firma? Does it 
help to tame or banish the monsters that have intimidated our political and 
judicial systems when faced with claims of Aboriginal peoples? We believe the 
answer is no on both counts. In its judgment, the Supreme Court shifted the 
ground under Aboriginal litigants’ feet and one must wonder if it was not the 
fear of monsters, in this instance an Aboriginal claim asserted in respect of the 
international border, which caused the Court to do so despite Chief Mitchell’s 
best efforts to frame his case narrowly and responsibly. 
                                                                                                                                                              
24 Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196, at 
197. 
25 Ibid.  
26 McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (2001), 
at 59. 
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2.  Do Aboriginal Plaintiffs Have the Prerogative to  
Characterize the Rights They Claim? 
It might be instructive to point out immediately that the pleadings in Mitchell 
were framed years before the Supreme Court’s realignment of this area of law 
through the Van der Peet trilogy.27 In fact those judgments were rendered ap-
proximately one month before Mitchell went to trial in September 1996. 
Before the Federal Court Trial Division, three distinct purposes for bringing 
goods across the international border were identified and two sources of those 
rights were pleaded. At issue was the right when bringing goods across the 
border for personal purposes, for community purposes or for the purpose of 
trade with other First Nations, to do so duty free. On this basis, evidence was 
led at trial. Two sources of these rights were pleaded, an Aboriginal right and 
treaty rights.28  
With respect to the scope of the rights claimed, it is instructive to refer to the 
plaintiffs’ opening statement on the first day of trial. A number of points were 
stated very clearly: 
Plaintiff is not asking this Court to endorse activities or behaviour that could be 
said to be antisocial or that threaten the state or its citizens. 
Chief Mitchell’s progress across the Cornwall International Bridge on March 22, 
1988 was not an act of defiance against Canadian sovereignty; 
There was nothing at all clandestine about the actions involved in this case. Chief 
Mitchell made a truthful oral declaration concerning the description and destination 
of the goods. 
So that it will be perfectly clear from the outset of the trial, Plaintiff states immedi-
ately and unequivocally that he is not here pleading and that this case is not about 
any right to bring across the Canada-U.S. border any form of fire-arm or any form 
of restricted or prohibited drug, alcohol, plants or the like. Nor do the facts in this 
case raise the issue of importation into Canada of commercial goods for the pri-
mary purpose of competing in the commercial mainstream in Canada. Plaintiff is 
not seeking any judicial determination of that issue in this case. 
                                                                                                                                                              
27 Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [hereinafter 
Gladstone]; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672. 
28 The treaty rights argument was based upon the rights in Article XV of the Treaty of 
Utrecht and Article III of the Jay Treaty as confirmed by Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent, as well 
as on treaty councils between the Crown and First Nations which took place in 1795, 1796 and 
1815. The treaty rights argument was unsuccessful in both the Federal Court Trial Division and the 
Federal Court of Appeal and was not pursued in the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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The modern context in which the Plaintiff seeks recognition of his Aboriginal right 
involves addressing the responsible exercise of rights and responsibilities and the 
appropriate respective roles for Mohawk authorities and Canadian authorities.29 
The trial judge understood the right as characterized by Chief Mitchell and 
the efforts by Chief Mitchell to frame the claims responsibly. His order, follow-
ing 85 pages of analysis, read in part: 
1.  the plaintiff as a Mohawk of Akwesasne resident in Canada has an existing 
Aboriginal right which is constitutionally protected by ss. 35 and 52 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 to pass and repass freely across what is now the 
Canada-United States boundary including the right to bring goods from the 
United States into Canada for personal and community use without having 
to pay customs duties on those goods. Goods for personal and community 
use includes goods used for sustenance, household goods and goods used 
for First Nations’ custom. The Aboriginal right includes the right to bring 
these goods from the United States into Canada for non-commercial scale 
trade with other First Nations. 
As the plaintiff has explained, the Aboriginal right does not include the right to 
bring into Canada any form of firearm, restricted or prohibited drug, alcohol, plants 
and the like. The Aboriginal right is also limited to the extent that any Mohawk of 
Akwesasne entering Canada with goods from the United States will be subject to 
search and declaration procedures at Canadian Customs.30 
The trial judge, while upholding the Aboriginal right, found that the right as 
pleaded was not to be found in a treaty within the meaning of section 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. The trial judge, however, did refer to the Jay Treaty 
as useful evidence of the historical context of the treatment of First Nations and 
of what the European powers were prepared to stipulate on behalf of the First 
Nations.31 
In the Federal Court of Appeal, all three judges once again acknowledged 
that the claim contemplated goods being brought across the border for various 
distinct purposes. Justice Létourneau in his reasons would have limited the 
                                                                                                                                                              
29 Mitchell v. M.N.R., Federal Court Trial Division, plaintiff’s opening statement, Sept. 1996, 
trial transcript Vol. 1, pp. 17, 18 and 50.  
30 Mitchell Fed. Court, supra, note 10, at 192. 
31 He stated  
“...The treaty does not have legal validity and is not enforceable in Canada, however, 
it is a historical document and therefore has some historical significance. Consequently it is 
useful as evidence of the historical context of the treatment of First Nations during that pe-
riod. However, since the First Nations were not involved in the negotiations, drafting or rat-
ification of the agreement, at best it is evidence of what two countries were prepared to 
include in an agreement between themselves on behalf of a third party.” 
ibid., at 187. 
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right to an Aboriginal right constitutionally protected by sections 35 and 52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982: 
...when crossing the international border at Cornwall Island, to bring with himself 
in Canada, for personal use or consumption, or for collective use or consumption 
by the members of the community of Akwesasne, goods bought in the State of New 
York without having to pay any duty or taxes to the Canadian government or au-
thority.32 
Justice Sexton, with Isaac C.J. agreeing, defined the right as follows: 
1.  the plaintiff as a Mohawk of Akwesasne resident in Canada has an existing 
aboriginal right which is constitutionally protected by sections 35 and 52 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, when crossing the international border from New 
York to Ontario or Quebec, to bring with him to Canada, for personal use or 
consumption, or for collective use or consumption by the members of the 
community of Akwesasne, or for non-commercial scale trade with First Nation 
communities in Ontario or Quebec, goods bought in the State of New York 
without having to pay any duty or taxes to the government of Canada.33 
Something strange happened to Chief Mitchell’s right as pleaded when it ar-
rived at the Supreme Court of Canada. It is interesting to note that McLachlin 
C.J., in summarizing the decisions below, acknowledged that both the courts 
below had included in their orders goods for personal and community use as well 
as goods for non-commercial scale trade with other First Nations. The Chief 
Justice then proceeded to re-characterize the Aboriginal right claimed.  
Notwithstanding that Chief Mitchell had characterized his claim as including 
three categories of goods, personal goods, community goods and goods for 
small scale trade, and notwithstanding that the four judges in the courts below 
had understood the claim to include those three categories of goods, the Chief 
Justice at paragraph 16 decided that the claim was really about bringing goods 
across the Canada/United States border for purposes of trade. The Chief Justice 
effectively telescoped the various and distinct elements of the right pleaded 
into, coincidentally, the characterization which might be seen to be the most 
controversial. Suddenly Chief Mitchell’s actions became entirely focused on 
trade. Suddenly, the evidence led by Chief Mitchell concerning the historical 
importance of trade to the Mohawks was represented as excluding evidence in 
regard to personal and community goods.  
                                                                                                                                                              
32 Mitchell v. M.N.R., [1999] 1 F.C. 375, at 394 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter Mitchell Fed. Court 
Appeal] in reference to the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1982”]. 
33 Ibid., at 399 (emphasis added). 
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The trial judge, while finding that one reason for Chief Mitchell’s actions 
was to renew an historical trading relationship with Tyendinaga through the 
giving of gifts, also found that the evidence showed that personal and commu-
nity goods were included in what Chief Mitchell brought across the border. 
This included supplies for a community store.34 
With respect, we note that there may be an inconsistency in the reasons of 
the Chief Justice as to what pre-contact activities must appropriately be invoked 
in support of a claim for Aboriginal rights. We have seen that the Aboriginal 
activities of transporting personal goods or community goods were not consid-
ered in the Court’s characterization of Chief Mitchell’s claim. There was, as we 
have described it, a telescoping of Aboriginal activities relating to personal, 
community and trade goods. On the other hand, when it came to Chief 
Mitchell’s considerable efforts to circumscribe his claim and the relief sought 
by limiting the nature of the goods in issue, by agreeing to stop and declare at 
Canadian Customs and by limiting the relief respecting trade to trade with other 
First Nations outside the commercial mainstream, the Court saw this as Chief 
Mitchell neglecting to invoke relevant Aboriginal activities and thus artificially 
and unjustifiably limiting his claim and his relief sought. The Chief Justice 
announced that : 
It may be tempting for a claimant or a court to tailor the right claimed to the con-
tours of the specific act at issue. In this case, for example, Chief Mitchell seeks to 
limit the scope of his claimed trading rights by designating specified trading part-
ners. Originally, he claimed the right to trade with other First Nations in Canada. 
After the Federal Court of Appeal decision, he further limited his claim to trade 
with First Nations in Quebec and Ontario. These self-imposed limitations may rep-
resent part of Chief Mitchell’s commendable strategy of negotiating with the gov-
                                                                                                                                                              
34 The trial judge wrote: 
The women who decided what goods would be brought across the border interpreted per-
sonal goods as being food products and household appliances. The rest of the food and per-
sonal items were for trade. As stated earlier, the motor oil was destined for Jock’s Store. 
Chief Mitchell testified that ninety-nine percent of the clientele at Jock’s Store are from the 
community of Akwesasne. The store sells groceries, household items, food products, and 
anything else that the community desires. It is regarded as an institution by the residents on 
Cornwall Island. Customs officers go in the store occasionally for small items. However, 
anyone coming from Canada to the store must pay a toll of $2.50 each way; non-Akwesasne 
residents rarely pay the toll to shop at Jock’s Store. Chief Mitchell described the most ex-
pensive item in Jock’s Store as a pair of work gloves. Chief Mitchell further testified that 
the goods supplied in the store are for the community of Akwesasne. If community mem-
bers were unable to get the goods they needed at the store because of sales to a non-native, 
the store owner would have to answer to the community. 
 Mitchell Fed. Court, [1997] 4 C.N.L.R. 103, at 110 (F.C.T.D.). (Jock’s Store is a commu-
nity store in Akwesasne). 
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ernment and minimizing the potential effects on its border control. However, nar-
rowing the claim cannot narrow the aboriginal practice relied upon, which is what 
defines the right. The essence of the alleged Mohawk tradition was not to bring 
goods across the St. Lawrence River to trade with designated communities, but 
rather to simply bring goods to trade.35  
In fact, what Chief Mitchell had done in framing his case and in pursuing it 
through the Federal Court of Canada was to make every effort to ask the courts 
for declarations regarding an exercise of rights which reflected and respected 
concerns for health and security, which reflected and respected concerns re-
garding disclosure of goods at Canada Customs and, in regard to the trade issue 
(and here is the great irony), which reflected and respected the evidence before 
the Court on the historical trade patterns of the Mohawks.  
On this latter point, it is difficult to see what the Chief Justice meant when 
she wrote “however, narrowing the claim cannot narrow the Aboriginal practice 
relied upon which is what defines the right”.36 After trial and the hearing before 
the Federal Court of Appeal, the claim in regard to trade with other First Na-
tions had been narrowed precisely to reflect the Aboriginal practice relied upon 
as revealed by the evidence. 
In any event, it seems a trifle unfair to Aboriginal litigants that after years of 
being told by the Supreme Court of Canada and the courts below that only 
claims cast specifically as to people, site and activity can be adjudicated by the 
courts (Kruger and Manual, Van der Peet, Adams, Côté, Pamajewon),37 they 
are now instructed that their claims and the relief sought must embrace the 
totality of “relevant” Aboriginal practice at the time of contact. For some rea-
son, the Mohawks’ Aboriginal practice of travelling throughout their territory 
with personal and community goods was not relevant in characterizing Chief 
Mitchell’s claim. On the other hand, the full range of pre-contact Aboriginal 
activity, which included for Binnie J. “pre-contact warrior activities” and “en-
gaging in military adventures on Canadian territory”,38 should have been in-
cluded as integral elements in Chief Mitchell’s claim. 
Professor Walters rushed to the defence of plaintiffs and their counsel in this 
context stating: 
                                                                                                                                                              
35 Mitchell SCC, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 20. It should be noted that contrary to what the 
Chief Justice here stated, Chief Mitchell “limited” his claim before the Federal Court of Appeal and 
this was acknowledged appreciatively by Letourneau J.A. in the Federal Court of Appeal, Mitchell 
Fed. Court Appeal, supra, note 32, at para. 20. 
36
 Mitchell SCC, ibid., at para. 20 
37 Kruger v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104; Van der Peet, supra, note 27; R. v. Adams, 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter Adams]; R. v. Coté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter Coté]; R. v. 
Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821 [hereinafter Pamajewon]. 
38 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 153.  
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In relation to aboriginal rights, however, the Court asserts the discretion to re-
characterize the claim. Says McLachlin C.J. in Mitchell, it is “tempting” for the 
claimant “to tailor the right” to their advantage, as if there is something morally 
wrong about framing one’s action in a manner that might lead to success. In fact, 
lawyers are under a professional obligation to do so; it is not a temptation but, one 
could say, an obligation upon the lawyer and a right of the claimant to “tailor the 
right” to achieve success.39 
We will leave it at that. 
The Chief Justice had not finished with the re-characterization of Chief 
Mitchell’s claim. She stated: “In another attempt at limitation, Chief Mitchell 
denies that his claim entails the right to pass freely over the border, i.e. mobility 
rights.”40 She is quite right. In his factum before the Supreme Court, Chief 
Mitchell stated: 
The right at issue in this Appeal, as determined after adjudication by two levels of 
the Federal Court of Canada, is clearly a right which applies when and if the Re-
spondent enters into Canada. When the right at issue is properly understood, the 
Appellant’s arguments on sovereignty and characterization fall away.41  
As we have seen, the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal under review 
before the Supreme Court of Canada clearly demonstrated that the justices of 
the Court of Appeal understood that Chief Mitchell was not invoking a mobility 
right. In any event, if the order of the Federal Court of Appeal had seemed 
ambiguous to the Supreme Court on the matter of mobility, it would not have 
been a difficult matter to have modified it so as to ensure that no such ambigu-
ity remained. After all, the three justices of the Court of Appeal understood the 
plaintiffs’ position that mobility was not in issue and Chief Mitchell had stated 
it unequivocally in his submissions to the Supreme Court. 
3.  Assessing the Weight to be Given to the Evidence Led 
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that findings of fact 
reached by the trial judge, including findings of fact based upon inference, can 
only be reversed if the trial judge has made a “palpable and overriding error”.42 
                                                                                                                                                              
39 Walters, “The Right to Cross a River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” prepared 
for the Toronto Conference of the Pacific Business and Law Institute, October 25, 2001, at 10. 
40 Mitchell SCC, supra note 35, at para. 22. 
41 Mitchell v. M.N.R., SCC, ibid., Respondent’s Factum, para. 23. 
42 Van der Peet, supra, note 27; Delgamuukw, supra, note 23; Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 
S.C.R. 254. 
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Very recently the Court has re-articulated the many and sound reasons for 
this rule, incorporating language from a judgment of the United States Supreme 
Court: 
The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superi-
ority of the trial judge’s position to make determinations of credibility. The trial 
judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that 
role comes expertise. Duplication of the trial judge’s efforts in the court of appeals 
would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination 
at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the parties to a case on 
appeal have already been forced to concentrate their energies and resources on per-
suading the trial judge that their account of the facts is the correct one; requiring 
them to persuade three more judges at the appellate level is requiring too much. As 
the Court has stated in a different context, the trial on the merits should be “the 
‘main event’ … rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’” … For these reasons, review of 
factual findings under the clearly-erroneous standard — with its deference to the 
trier of fact — is the rule, not the exception. 
Further comments regarding the advantages possessed by the trial judge have been 
made by R. D. Gibbens in “Appellate Review of Findings of Fact” (1992), 13 Adv. 
Q. 445, at p. 446: 
The trial judge is said to have an expertise in assessing and weighing the 
facts developed at trial. Similarly, the trial judge has also been exposed to 
the entire case. The trial judge has sat through the entire case and his ul-
timate judgment reflects this total familiarity with the evidence. The in-
sight gained by the trial judge who has lived with the case for several 
days, weeks or even months may be far deeper than that of the Court of 
Appeal whose view of the case is much more limited and narrow, often 
being shaped and distorted by the various orders or rulings being chal-
lenged.43 
It is striking that the focus of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Mitchell was 
on reviewing, re-evaluating and discounting particular items in the evidentiary 
record. This appears inconsistent with the principles articulated in Housen v. 
Nikolaisen, especially given that the trial in Mitchell lasted over 30 days. The 
majority of the Federal Court of Appeal, in contrast, appreciated the trial 
judge’s handling of the “totality” of the evidence.44 
                                                                                                                                                              
43 Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, paras. 13-14. At the beginning of this passage the 
Court is quoting the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 
(1985), at pp. 574-75. See also note 46. 
44 Mitchell Fed. Court Appeal, supra, note 32, Letourneau J.A., at para. 41 and Sexton J.A., 
at para. 47. Over 25 days of evidence was led at trial. The complete record, including expert reports 
and transcripts from the trial is close to 100 volumes of material. In accordance with the Rules of 
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With respect to archaeological evidence, for example, the Supreme Court 
discounted evidence that the Mohawks traded in copper which originated on the 
north shore of Lake Superior because it found that the evidence only showed 
that the copper originated on the north shore of Lake Superior and not that the 
Mohawks obtained the copper through direct trading with their northern 
neighbours. The Court discounted a second archaeological document because it 
only provided evidence in north-south trade in a single item — this the Su-
preme Court found was not sufficiently compelling. 
With respect to this aspect of the evidence, we note simply that the Court did 
not find that the trial judge had in any way erred in taking into account the 
archaeological evidence — it simply disputed the weight which he (and the 
majority of the Court of Appeal) had placed upon it. It is also striking that, 
while the Court made much of what it saw as a contradiction in McKeown J.’s 
finding of an Aboriginal right on the basis of “little direct evidence”, the Court 
also found that: “McKeown J. correctly observed that indisputable evidence is 
not required to establish an aboriginal right. Neither must the claim be estab-
lished on the basis of direct evidence of pre-contact practices, customs and 
traditions, which is inevitably scarce. Either requirement would ‘preclude in 
practice any successful claim for the existence’ of an aboriginal right”.45 
If the evidentiary inquiry mandated by the Van der Peet test is so flexible 
that an appellate court can re-evaluate the weight to be accorded to evidence 
which, by its very nature, is scarce, then what has become of the principle that 
appellate courts owe considerable deference to findings made by the trial judge 
concerning the facts which prove, or fail to prove, an Aboriginal right?46 The 
latter principle is, in theory, affirmed in the Mitchell decision.47 In effect, how-
ever, it was clearly jettisoned. 
It is early to say what the effects of the Mitchell decision will be on the in-
tegrity of the trial process. It is safe to predict, however, that both plaintiffs and 
defendants will be inclined to rely upon the judgment to argue that, at least in 
cases concerning issues of Aboriginal rights, appellate courts may and, indeed 
should, review and re-evaluate the weight given to the evidence by a trial judge. 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Supreme Court, a very much condensed application record of some six volumes was filed 
before the Supreme Court of Canada and one copy of the entire case was sent up from the Court of 
Appeal.  
45 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 52, quoting Van der Peet, supra, note 27, at para. 62 
[emphasis added]. 
46 A principle reaffirmed in both Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, and Delgamuukw, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
47 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at para. 51. 
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III.  THE SOVEREIGN INCOMPATIBILITY TEST —  
ONE BULLET DODGED 
At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown invited the Court to adopt a test 
related to compatibility with Crown sovereignty that would, if accepted, seri-
ously compromise a great deal of the work of the Supreme Court and other 
courts over the past several decades in examining the promise of section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.48 The Chief Justice succinctly stated the Crown’s 
position in her reasons: 
... I add a note, however, on the government’s contention that s. 35(1) of the Con-
stitution Act, 1982 extends constitutional protection only to those aboriginal prac-
tices, customs and traditions that are compatible with the historical and modern ex-
exercise of Crown sovereignty. Pursuant to this argument, any Mohawk practice of 
cross-border trade, even if established on the evidence, would be barred from rec-
ognition under s. 35(1) as incompatible with the Crown’s sovereign interest in 
regulating its borders.49 
The Chief Justice, quite rightly in our view, declined the invitation of the 
Crown on this point and stated that in the past the Court had: 
...affirmed the doctrines of extinguishment, infringement and justification as the 
appropriate framework for resolving conflicts between aboriginal rights and com-
peting claims, including claims based on Crown sovereignty.50 
In essence, the Crown’s contention was that in the case of Aboriginal activi-
ties deemed to be incompatible with the historical and modern exercise of 
Crown sovereignty, no right would crystallize. We can see how problematic 
this would be for establishing virtually any Aboriginal right in the context of 
the Court’s contention in Mitchell that the entire bundle of Aboriginal activities 
must be pleaded as rights. Justice Binnie in his minority reasons raised the 
spectre of Mohawk military pre-contact activity and the fact that the evidence 
showed in this case that Mohawks regularly exploited lands in what is now 
Canada for many purposes including that of war. Indeed, this had already been 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in R. v. Adams, a case in which the Court, 
notwithstanding direct linkages between Mohawk warrior activity and fishing 
activity, still felt comfortable recognizing the specific pre-contact activity of 
fishing as giving rise to an Aboriginal right to fish.51 There was no suggestion 
                                                                                                                                                              
48 Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
49 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35 at para. 61. 
50 Ibid., at para. 63. 
51 Adams, supra, note 37, at para. 44-46. 
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in Adams that warring activities would have to be grafted on to the activity of 
fishing in Lake St. Francis. 
In Mitchell, however, Binnie J. returned to the pre-contact warrior activity of 
Mohawks: 
I take an illustration from the evidence in this case. The trial judge showed that 
pre-contact the Mohawks, as a military force, moved under their own command 
through what is now parts of southern Ontario and southern Quebec. The evidence, 
taken as a whole, suggests that military values were “a defining feature of Mohawk 
[or Iroquois] culture”, to use my colleague’s expression at para. 54. Indeed, the 
Mohawk warrior tradition has its adherents to this day. As previously noted, the 
trial judge at p. 35 thought the Mohawks’ military activities in the St. Lawrence River 
Valley probably got in the way of their trading activities: 
[I]t is difficult to see how an army would engage in trade with their ene-
mies while in pursuit of them. 
However, important as they may have been to the Mohawk identity as a people, 
it could not be said, in my view, that pre-contact warrior activities gave rise under 
successor regimes to a legal right under s. 35(1) to engage in military adventures 
on Canadian territory. Canadian sovereign authority has, as one of its inherent 
characteristics, a monopoly on the lawful use of military force within its territory. I 
do not accept that the Mohawks could acquire under s. 35(1) a legal right to deploy 
a military force in what is now Canada, as and when they choose to do so, even if 
the warrior tradition was to be considered a defining feature of pre-contact Mohawk 
society. Section 35(1) should not be interpreted to throw on the Crown the burden 
of demonstrating subsequent extinguishment by “clear and plain” measures (Glad-
stone, supra, at para. 31) of a “right” to organize a private army, or a requirement to 
justify such a limitation after 1982 under the Sparrow standard. This example, re-
mote as it is from the particular claim advanced in this case, usefully illustrates the 
principled limitation flowing from sovereign incompatibility in the s. 35(1) analy-
sis.52 
Justice Binnie concluded: 
In my opinion, sovereign incompatibility continues to be an element in the s. 
35(1) analysis, albeit a limitation that will be sparingly applied. For the most part, 
the protection of practices, traditions and customs that are distinctive to aboriginal 
cultures in Canada does not raise legitimate sovereignty issues at the definitional 
stage.53 
The problem we see with Binnie J.’s test is twofold.  
                                                                                                                                                              
52 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at paras. 152, 153 [emphasis added]. 
53 Ibid., at para. 154. 
260  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
First, the doctrines of extinguishment and sovereign incompatibility are too 
definitive and irrevocable. While the matter has not yet been settled by the 
courts in Canada, one wonders whether a right that has been held to be extin-
guished by the Supreme Court of Canada could possibly be resurrected in a 
future age under other conditions. The same applies with respect to the doctrine 
of sovereign incompatibility which suggests that a right did not crystallize 
during the complex process of sovereign succession or the merging of sover-
eignties. Again, could such a right later be found on the basis of revised judicial 
analysis or newly understood history to have in fact survived sovereign succes-
sion or the merging of sovereignties? In the post-1982 constitutional context, 
Binnie J.’s theory introduces a measure of vulnerability for rights understood to 
have received protection through section 35. 
The second difficulty we have is that the test is subjective, is applied without 
evidence and depends upon the referents of time and place.54 It involves two 
stages of characterization — characterizing the right in issue and then charac-
terizing the sovereignty to which the right is alleged to be incompatible.  
We see the first problem in Mitchell where, as developed above, the Court in 
our respectful opinion, mischaracterized the right being claimed. This enabled 
the minority justices, after endorsing the “sovereign incompatibility” test, to 
review the national and international law on the matter of the movement of 
persons and goods across international boundaries and to find that, inherent to 
national sovereignty, was the power to control the entrance of persons and 
goods into a state. This made it easier for them to then find that the re-
characterized right, expressed as an “international trading/mobility right”, did 
not meet the sovereign incompatibility test. Whether this is so, or not, is en-
tirely irrelevant to the case that Chief Mitchell put to the courts for adjudica-
tion. 
The second problem relates to the characterization of the attributes of sover-
eignty. There was a time in the western world when church and state were one 
and many a heresy was considered incompatible with the sovereignty of the 
state. Indeed, we should remind ourselves that certain attributes of Afghan 
“sovereignty” under the Taliban may have been rendered totally irrelevant only 
in the last several months and that many activities which would have been 
candidates for sovereign incompatibility in that country on September 11, 2001 
are now being exercised and indeed celebrated.  
While these are perhaps extreme examples of shifting standards considered 
to be essential to state sovereign interests, they do represent past realities, not 
future speculation. The reality of the interface between Canadian sovereignty 
                                                                                                                                                              
54 See the dissenting reasons of McLachlin J. (as she then was) in Van der Peet, supra, note 
46. 
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and the claims of Aboriginal peoples has also shifted in the past, albeit less 
dramatically, and this process has accelerated with the development of the 
international regime for indigenous peoples55 and, of course, the introduction of 
section 35 into the Constitution of Canada.56 One interesting manifestation of 
this would be the changing understanding of the relationship between Canada’s 
international obligations and her obligations towards the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada in the context of the application of the Migratory Birds Convention of 
1916.57 
The Crown’s international treaty power would surely be said to be an essen-
tial condition of statehood and an integral element of Canadian sovereignty. 
The Crown may enter into and has entered into international treaties in which it 
commits itself to protect certain species of wildlife. Prior to 1982, the position 
taken by the Crown was that if the exercise of this aspect of sovereignty con-
flicted with Aboriginal practices, those practices would have to be considered 
irreconcilable with Crown sovereignty. The Crown in Right of the United 
Kingdom entered into just such a treaty with the United States of America in 
1916, with respect to migratory birds — the 1916 Migratory Birds Convention. 
Parliament enacted the Migratory Birds Convention Act58 to give effect to the 
international convention in Canada prohibiting the hunting of migratory birds 
during certain times of the year and regulating various other activities related to 
migratory birds and their habitats. These prohibitions conflicted with, and 
indeed were irreconcilable with, Aboriginal and treaty rights to hunt.  
                                                                                                                                                              
55 Referred to to some extent by Binnie J. in Mitchell SCC, supra, note 35, at paras. 81-83. 
See for further illustration: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered 
into force Mar. 23, 1976; Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull. 59, entered into force Sept. 5, 1991; Report of the 
Nuuk Meeting of Experts to review the experience of countries in the operation of schemes of 
internal self-government for Indigenous peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/42, 25 November 1991; 
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994); 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Approved by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights on February 26, 1997, at its 1333rd session, 95th Regular 
Session), OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 Doc.6 (1997); Economic and Social Council Resolution 2000/22, 
U.N. Doc. E/RES/2000/22, 28 July 2000 establishing the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; 
Mayagna (Sumo) Community of Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., August 
31, 2001; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Fact Sheet No.9 (Rev.1), The Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs9.htm. 
56 Adams, supra, note 37, at 121-122 and Côté, supra, note 37, at 174.  
57 1916 Convention Between the United Kingdom and the United States of America for the 
Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States, signed in Washington, August 16, 
1916. 
58 Migratory Birds Convention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. M-7. 
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In cases decided prior to 1982 dealing with treaty rights of Aboriginal per-
sons to hunt migratory birds, it was held by the Courts, sometimes with much 
regret,59 that treaty rights were not justiciable in the face of conflicting federal 
regulatory provisions. During that same period, Canada took the position in 
treaty negotiations with Aboriginal peoples that it was bound under interna-
tional law not to recognize the Aboriginal right to hunt migratory birds year 
round.60 
Two things happened following the enactment of section 35 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982. First, the courts began to read down the sovereign international 
obligations of Canada under the Convention and to declare and secure Aborigi-
nal and treaty rights to hunt birds in purported violation of the Convention. Of 
considerable significance here is the fact that in so doing the courts held that 
there had been no pre-1982 extinguishment of the Aboriginal rights thought at 
the time to be incompatible with Canada’s sovereign commitments under inter-
national treaty. At the same time, in clear confirmation that reconciliation of 
Crown sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal societies and their activities is 
a reciprocal exercise, Canada initiated negotiations with the United States of 
America to amend the 1916 Convention to bring it into line with the Aboriginal 
and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Parliament repealed the 
Migratory Birds Convention Act replacing it with the Migratory Birds Conven-
tion Act 1994, to implement the amended Convention.61 
So surely it can be asked: by whom and at what point in the historical con-
tinuum is the decree made that an activity is so incompatible with state sover-
eignty that it cannot possibly ever result in rights or in title? 
Furthermore, any argument about sovereign incompatibility is going to be a 
purely theoretical construct in the absence of evidence of how the exercise of 
the Aboriginal right would be incompatible with Canadian sovereignty. In 
Mitchell, the essence of the Crown’s argument on sovereign incompatibility 
was that any Mohawk practice of cross-border trade was incompatible with the 
Crown’s sovereign interest in regulating its borders. This is an argument which 
                                                                                                                                                              
59 See Johnson J. of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal in R. v. Sikyea (1964), 43 
D.L.R. (2d) 150, at 158 (N.W.T.C.A.); affd [1964] S.C.R. 642; R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267. 
60 See, for example, James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, s. 24, paras. 24.14.2, 
24.14.7; The Western Arctic Claim — The Inuvialuit Final Agreement, ss. 14(11), 14(12), 14(37), 
14(38); Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of Canada, the Council for Yukon 
Indians and the Government of the Yukon, ch. 16, paras. 16.3.9 and 16.3.12; Sahtu Dene and Metis 
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, para. 13.3.5 and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, art. 
5, part 9, para. 5.9.4. 
61 Protocol Between Canada and the United States of America Amending the 1916 Conven-
tion for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Canada and the United States, signed on December 
14, 1995, ratified on September 9, 1999, preamble, s. II 4(a); Migratory Birds Convention Act 1994, 
at ss. 2(3), 4, and 12(2).  
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might, if proved, justify limitation of the exercise of an Aboriginal right and as 
such properly belongs at the “justification” stage of the inquiry into Aboriginal 
rights.62  
As will be developed further, the only appropriate approach to assertions of 
incompatibility between Aboriginal rights and Crown sovereignty is to exercise 
control, if control is necessary, at the level of the exercise of rights, not the 
existence of those rights. What is more, the law and its interpreters should 
strive to identify and achieve reconciliation between apparently competing 
claims rather than to seek out incompatibility. 
IV.  THE APPLICATION OF THE VAN DER PEET TEST AND 
“INDIANNESS” 
A review of the work of the Court in attempting to reconcile Aboriginal 
rights and Aboriginal title with Crown sovereignty reveals a spectrum. At one 
end of the spectrum are situated what are considered to be the classical tradi-
tional activities of Aboriginal peoples — hunting, fishing, trapping and gather-
ing. At the other end of the spectrum are situated what are perceived to be 
commercial, industrial and economic activities. At the traditional end of the 
spectrum, reconciliation has meant recognition and protection of Aboriginal 
rights and title and an accommodation by the Crown. As we move along the 
spectrum, however, the balance shifts and as we arrive at the other end recon-
ciliation results in the reading down of Aboriginal rights and title in favour of 
Crown sovereignty. This, of course, is the “integral to a distinctive society” test 
being applied in a rather self-serving way.  
Contrasting the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Adams with Mitchell v. 
M.N.R. is instructive as the two cases involved the same people — Mohawks 
— and essentially the same territory — southern Quebec and Ontario. In Adams 
Lamer C.J. reviewed the expert evidence and concluded as follows: 
The general picture presented by the testimony of Parent and Trigger, when con-
sidered together, is that prior to 1603 it is unclear which aboriginal peoples made 
use of the St. Lawrence Valley, although there is evidence to suggest that at that 
time the lands were occupied in part by a group of Iroquois unrelated to the Mo-
hawks. From 1603 to the 1650s the area was the subject of conflict between various 
aboriginal peoples, including the Mohawks. During this period the Mohawks 
clearly fished for food in the St. Lawrence River, either because the Mohawks ex-
                                                                                                                                                              
62 This was an argument made by counsel for the Mohawks of Akwesasne before the Su-
preme Court of Canada. Interestingly, Manitoba supported this argument in its factum and agreed, 
on this one issue, with the Mohawks’ contention that sovereign incompatibility was essentially an 
argument on justification. 
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ercised military control over the region and adopted the territory as fishing and 
hunting grounds, or because the Mohawks conducted military campaigns in the re-
gion during which they were required to rely on the fish in the St. Lawrence River 
and Lake St. Francis for sustenance. 
This general picture, regardless of the uncertainty which arises because of the 
witnesses’ conflicting characterizations of the Mohawks’ control and use over this 
area from 1603 to 1632, supports the trial judge’s conclusion that the Mohawks 
have an aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St. Francis. Either because reliance 
on the fish in the St. Lawrence River for food was a necessary part of their cam-
paigns of war, or because the lands of this area constituted Mohawk hunting and 
fishing grounds, the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that fishing for food in 
the St. Lawrence River and, in particular, in Lake St. Francis, was a significant part 
of the life of the Mohawks from a time dating from at least 1603 and the arrival of 
Samuel de Champlain into the area. The fish were not significant to the Mohawks 
for social or ceremonial reasons; however, they were an important and significant 
source of subsistence for the Mohawks. 
… No aboriginal group will ever be able to provide conclusive evidence of what 
took place prior to contact (and here the witnesses agree that it is unclear which 
aboriginal peoples were fishing in the fishing area prior to 1603); evidence that at 
contact a custom was a significant part of their distinctive culture should be suffi-
cient to demonstrate that prior to contact that custom was also a significant part of 
their distinctive culture. The appellant here has clearly demonstrated that at the 
time of contact fishing in the St. Lawrence River and Lake St. Francis for food was 
a significant part of the life of the Mohawks. This is sufficient to demonstrate that it 
was so prior to contact.63 
Contrast this with how the Court dealt with evidence respecting the same 
people and the same territory in Mitchell, evidence found sufficient by the trial 
judge and the Federal Court of Appeal. The Court is obviously less comfortable 
with the idea that trading practices and northerly travel coincided prior to the 
arrival of Europeans than that fishing practices and northerly travel coincided in 
that period. In Mitchell, the Chief Justice wrote: 
While the ancestral home of the Mohawks lay in the Mohawk Valley of present-
day New York State, the evidence establishes that, before the arrival of Europeans, 
they travelled north on occasion across the St. Lawrence River. We may assume 
they travelled with goods to sustain themselves. There was also ample evidence be-
fore McKeown J. to support his finding that trade was a central, distinguishing fea-
ture of the Iroquois in general and the Mohawks in particular. This evidence 
indicates the Mohawks were well situated for trade, and engaged in small-scale ex-
                                                                                                                                                              
63 Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at paras. 44-46 (emphasis added). 
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change with other First Nations. A critical question in this case, however, is 
whether these trading practices and northerly travel coincided prior to the arrival of 
Europeans; that is, does the evidence establish an ancestral Mohawk practice of 
transporting goods across the St. Lawrence River for the purposes of trade? Only if 
this ancestral practice is established does it become necessary to determine whether 
it is an integral feature of Mohawk culture with continuity to the present day. 64  
After a careful reading of the judgments in Adams and Mitchell it is not clear 
how the evidence accepted by the Court in Adams was that much more proba-
tive than that in Mitchell.65 
Other examples of harsher scrutiny being applied by the Court when it 
comes to so-called commercial or economic activities are to be found in the 
jurisprudence.66  
The Supreme Court has previously signalled a reluctance to include so-called 
“commercial activities” within the meaning of Aboriginal rights in its judgment 
in R. v. Pamajewon.67 In that case the fact situation and the right claimed in-
volved gambling — in the words of the Court “high stakes gambling” — and a 
claim that the Aboriginal claimants’ right to self-government encompassed the 
right to regulate on-reserve gambling. 
These claims were rejected outright. While the Court was prepared to as-
sume, without deciding, that section 35(1) included self-government rights, it 
insisted that those rights must be proven in accordance with the “integral to the 
distinctive culture” test. The Court rejected the argument that a more general 
right to manage Aboriginal reserve lands could encompass the right to organize 
and regulate high stakes gambling. 
In Pamajewon,68 the Court expressed its agreement with an observation 
made by the trial judge that “commercial lotteries such as bingo are a twentieth 
century phenomena and nothing of the kind existed amongst aboriginal peoples 
and was never part of the means by which those societies were traditionally 
sustained or socialized”. Thus, any commercial activity which the Crown can 
successfully characterize as “a twentieth century phenomenon” may not come 
within the ambit of Aboriginal rights protected by section 35(1).69 Indeed, any 
                                                                                                                                                              
64 Mitchell SCC, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
65 Adams, supra, note 63, at paras. 44, 45; Mitchell SCC, ibid., at paras. 48, 49, 101. 
66 Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, may be considered an exception although the product be-
ing traded was rather specialized — herring spawn on kelp — and was a product associated with 
the “Indianness” of the Heiltsuk people.  
67 Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821. See also Morse, “Permafrost Rights: Aboriginal Self-
Government and the Supreme Court in R. v. Pamajewon” (1997), 42 McGill L.J. 1011. 
68 Ibid., at para. 29.  
69 For a recent example see R. v. Marshall (2001), 191 N.S.R. (2d) 323, at para. 90-95, affd 
on appeal in (2002), 202 N.S.R. (2d) 42. 
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contention that Aboriginal rights encompass commercial activity is met with 
harsh scrutiny.70 
This propensity to limit the scope of Aboriginal rights to matters outside of 
the “commercial mainstream” is also evident in recent decisions from the Fed-
eral Court of Appeal concerning the ambit of section 87 of the Indian Act. In 
these decisions, that Court has limited the protection of income from taxation 
so that income which is earned in the “commercial mainstream” is not consid-
ered to be located on reserve. Such income is, therefore, not tax exempt in 
virtue of section 87.71 Thus in its recent decision in Shilling v. Canada, the 
Federal Court of Appeal stated: 
That an Indian is employed on a reserve is an indication that he or she is acquiring 
employment income as an Indian qua Indian, in employment integral to the life of 
the reserve: Folster, supra, at paragraph 14. The opposite would also be true, that 
is, employment off-reserve is an indication that the Indian is acquiring employment 
income in the commercial mainstream.72 
This dichotomy between “Indian activities” which are protected by section 
87, and “commercial mainstream” activities, which are not, has its origins in 
statements made by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band. That case was about the meaning and scope of sections 87, 89 and 90 of 
the Indian Act. For the majority, La Forest J. stated of those sections: 
… the purpose of the legislation is not to remedy the economically disadvantaged 
position of Indians by ensuring that Indians may acquire, hold, and deal with prop-
erty in the commercial mainstream on different terms than their fellow citizens. An 
                                                                                                                                                              
70 The irony is, of course, that commercial dealings were at the heart of Aboriginal/European 
relations from contact as evidenced by the importance of the fur trade in its many manifestations 
from coast to coast to coast. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade; Their Role as Hunters, Trappers and 
Middlemen in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay (1974), Chapter 11, especially at 205-212; 
Milloy, The Plains Cree: Trade Diplomacy and War, 1790 to 1870 (1988), at 105. 
The idea of restricting Aboriginal commercial activity was born when fear of competition 
with settler activity arose. This occurred even in the face of treaty promises to assist in economic 
development. Dr. Carl Beal has noted “Access to markets was controlled by the Indian Agent 
through the permit system. The Indian agent regulated both sales and purchases by Indians. That 
system had been authorized by the Indian Act of 1876, reinforced by an Order in Council in 1880, 
and further strengthened after 1888 to curtail as far as possible Indian access to markets to sell 
agricultural surpluses and purchase agricultural equipment. The Department even sought legislation 
to forbid the giving of credit to Indians.” Beal goes on to note that after 1890, Indian Commissioner 
Hayter Reed strictly regulated Indian access to farm equipment. Beal, Money, Markets and Eco-
nomic Development in Saskatchewan Indian Reserve Communities, 1870-1930s (1994), at 186-187. 
71 Southwind v. Canada, [1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 233 (F.C.A.); Recalma v. Canada, [1998] 2 
C.N.L.R. 279 (F.C.A.); Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
72 [2001] F.C.A. 178, at para. 48. (Application for leave to appeal refused by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, March 14, 2002.) 
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examination of the decisions bearing on these sections confirms that Indians who 
acquire and deal in property outside lands reserved for their use, deal with it on the 
same basis as all other Canadians.73 
It would be erroneous to apply an approach developed with respect to the 
statutory protection in section 87 to limit the scope of constitutionally protected 
rights, and we do not mean to suggest that the “commercial mainstream” crite-
rion which has been developed in the case-law on section 87 was applied by the 
Court in Mitchell. However, Mitchell was another case in which activities 
deemed by the Court to be commercial in nature appear to have been scruti-
nized more closely than activities which were generally understood to be asso-
ciated with “Indianness”, such as hunting and fishing.74 
However relevant the concepts of the “commercial mainstream” as opposed 
to “Indianness” may be to the content of section 87 of the Indian Act,75 they are 
irrelevant to the issue of Aboriginal rights. It cannot seriously be argued that 
Aboriginal societies in pre-contact times did not have an economy, or that they 
did not govern themselves. Yet, by placing the burden of proof upon Aboriginal 
claimants to prove in minute detail the historical activity and practices which 
form the modern right today, the Van der Peet test forces us to engage in an 
inquiry which essentially presumes that Aboriginal nations did not have an 
economy or that they did not govern themselves. The test certainly attributes 
virtually no weight to those cultural and societal markers. The particularization 
of the right, which is mandated by the test, forces us to dissect culture and 
society into its smallest elements in order to determine if the exact practice 
required to prove the right being exercised today prevailed four hundred years 
ago rather than focusing attention on viable and dynamic cultures and societies 
in which such activities would have naturally occurred or evolved.  
Inevitably, the rights which are most often presumed to have their origins in 
pre-contact times are those which involve traditional subsistence activities: 
hunting and fishing for food and cultural needs. All other activities are subject 
to a tremendous burden of proof in order to be established as a right.76 Ironi-
                                                                                                                                                              
73 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85, at 131. 
74 Compare with Adams, supra, note 63. Interestingly, there even continues to be a debate 
about trapping as an Aboriginal activity, see, for instance Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at 
paras. 22 and 55.  
75 And we do not mean to suggest that we agree with the application of this distinction in the 
statutory interpretation of s. 87. 
76
 Stuart Rush, in his article “The Treatment of Evidence in Mitchell”, presented to The Na-
tional Conference on Canadian Aboriginal Law — 2001 of The Pacific Business and Law Institute, 
in Toronto, Ontario, October 25, 26, 2001, has argued that no Aboriginal claimant has been suc-
cessful in establishing anything other than hunting and fishing rights under the Van der Peet test, at 
p. 1. 
268  Supreme Court Law Review (2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
cally, in Mitchell, at least three of the provincial interveners before the Supreme 
Court of Canada took the position that trading rights could not be an Aboriginal 
right as all human beings historically engaged in trade, and there was nothing 
particularly “Aboriginal” about it.77 This demonstrates not only the extent to 
which presumptions regarding “Indianness” have been subsumed into the Van 
der Peet test but also how that test effectively marginalizes Aboriginal culture 
and society. 
V.  THE VAN DER PEET TEST AND CONTEMPORARY 
CROWN/ABORIGINAL NEGOTIATIONS 
There exists an intriguing dichotomy between the rights discourse and analy-
sis enshrined in the Van der Peet test and that promoted by government in 
negotiations with Aboriginal peoples. The focus of the Van der Peet test is on 
the distant past — the period of first contact between a First Nation and Euro-
peans. In Mitchell, this meant that considerable evidence and analysis was 
devoted to a time period some four hundred years ago.  
The determining factors in the decision of the Supreme Court in Mitchell 
were not what was culturally meaningful to the Mohawks of Akwesasne and 
their ancestors.78 Trade with other First Nations was a central distinguishing 
feature of Mohawk society. But, that fact alone was apparently insufficient to 
ground the right in this case, rather the Court required evidence that such trade 
took place in a northerly direction. The focus is on the cultural significance of 
the geographic direction of the activity some 400 years ago, rather then the 
importance of trade to Mohawk society.79 
The Van der Peet test, as it was applied in Mitchell, fails to take into account 
any relevant contemporary factors. The test is utterly frozen in time. It requires 
the judiciary to peer back into a time centuries ago to determine what was 
culturally relevant and significant to a specific people at that time, and to define 
contemporary rights on that basis.80  
                                                                                                                                                              
77 Mitchell SCC, supra, note 64; see the Intervener factums filed by Quebec, New Brunswick 
and Manitoba. 
78 For a more detailed analysis on this particular point, see Walters, “The Right to Cross a 
River?: Aboriginal Rights in the Mitchell Case” prepared for the Toronto Conference of the Pacific 
Business and Law Institute, October 25, 2001.  
79 The Supreme Court had previously decided, in Adams, supra, note 63 that the Mohawks 
of Akwesasne had Aboriginal rights in Akwesasne and the surrounding area. Thus the historical 
links between the area of Akwesasne and the ancestors of the Mohawks had already been estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the Court. 
80 This is precisely what McLachlin J. (as she then was) criticized in her dissenting reasons 
in Van der Peet, see supra, notes 18, 19, 20. 
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It is important to recall that the Mohawk Territory of Akwesasne is traversed 
by the international border and in puzzling ways. In order to cross from the 
Quebec side of the reserve to the Ontario side it is necessary to cross the inter-
national border and international customs and immigration posts, but to cross 
from the Quebec side into the New York side there is no customs and immigra-
tion post and indeed no discernible boundary line. Everyday life in Akwesasne 
involves coping with these multiple, superimposed jurisdictions. This reality 
was very much a focus of the evidence at trial in Mitchell. 
How can the Van der Peet test be meaningful to the contemporary aspira-
tions and realities of First Nations communities, such as the Mohawks of Ak-
wesasne, when those everyday realities are ignored at the expense of a 
historical investigation into their ancestors’ precise activities some 400 years 
ago?  
If, as the Supreme Court has implied in Pamajewon, activities which are 
characterized as “twentieth century phenomena” can never form the subject of 
an Aboriginal right, there is little content to the Aboriginal rights protected by 
section 35(1) for Aboriginal peoples whose visions of and aspirations for their 
societies and their future go beyond hunting, fishing and trapping for food and 
social activities. How would this approach to judicial analysis of rights and 
power be viewed in other areas of the law such as fundamental freedoms and 
equality rights, the Charter and criminal law or federalism and judicial inde-
pendence? 
The rights analysis suggested by the Van der Peet test is rendered all the more 
incongruous when it is contrasted with the contemporary discourse of the gov-
ernment of Canada in its evolving policy on Aboriginal peoples and in its nego-
tiations with Aboriginal peoples through a continuing and constitutionally 
mandated treaty process.  
In negotiations with government on the exercise and implementation of Abo-
riginal rights, the focus is on the future. While the past is certainly still relevant 
to matters such as title claims, negotiations over governance issues, economic 
development and other matters are typically oriented towards the future. Gener-
ally, this is at the behest of the federal and provincial governments which do 
not wish to focus on a past where Aboriginal rights were, more often than not, 
honoured in the breach.81 Thus the 1997 policy paper Gathering Strength: 
Canada’s Aboriginal Action Plan announced: 
In developing its Aboriginal Action Plan, the Government of Canada sincerely 
hopes and believes that Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people can develop a com-
mon vision for the future. This vision must include the means for Aboriginal people 
to participate fully in the economic, political, cultural and social life of Canada in a 
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manner which preserves and enhances the collective identities of their communi-
ties, and allows them to build for a better future. This can and will be achieved as 
all parties accept, in a spirit of mutual respect and mutual responsibility, the chal-
lenge of strengthening the partnership between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Ca-
nadians.82 
Treaty negotiations today, whether on the inherent right to governance or ter-
ritory and resources, are focused upon how rights will be exercised in a con-
temporary way and within the context of contemporary Canadian society. 
While Aboriginal and Canadian government negotiators often disagree about 
how the rights can be reconciled in this contemporary context, there is no ques-
tion that the focus of this rights discourse is relevant and meaningful.  
In Gathering Strength, we read the following under the heading “A Treaty 
Relationship”: 
A vision for the future should build on recognition of the rights of Aboriginal peo-
ple and on the treaty relationship. Beginning almost 300 years ago, treaties were 
signed between the British Crown and many First Nations living in what was to be-
come Canada. These treaties between the Crown and First Nations are basic build-
ing blocks in the creation of our country.83 
In its Inherent Rights Policy, the government of Canada states: 
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-government as an 
existing right within section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. It has developed an 
approach to implementation that focuses on reaching practical and workable 
agreements on how self-government will be exercised, rather than trying to de-
fine it in abstract terms. The Government believes that this approach is flexible and 
will allow all interested parties to make meaningful progress in the realization of 
Aboriginal self-government.84 
While we would take issue with the Policy insofar as it limits negotiation of 
the inherent right solely to matters which the Government of Canada unilater-
ally defines as “internal”, we note that the focus of negotiations, according to 
the Policy, is on working out arrangements and structures for the contemporary 
exercise of the rights.  
Shin Imai, in a short commentary on the effects of the Mitchell decision, as-
serts that the approach adopted by the Supreme Court hampers negotiations 
                                                                                                                                                              
82 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Gathering Strength — Canada’s Aboriginal Action 
Plan (1998), http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/gs/chg_e.html. 
83 Ibid., at 6. 
84 Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Federal Policy Guide on Aboriginal Self-
Government, 1995. Introduction, at 1 (emphasis added). 
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because of its focus on recreating historical situations rather than contemporary 
issues: 
Why does this approach detrimentally affect negotiations? It does so by forcing the 
parties to place all their energies into recreating a historical situation that existed 
over four hundred years ago. There is little incentive to compromise on a historical 
vision, especially if it is that vision of history which will determine the outcome of 
litigation. The parties are not rewarded for attempting to make compromises or ad-
dress the concerns of the other party.85 
We are not suggesting that Aboriginal peoples should abandon litigation to 
concentrate solely on negotiations. Negotiation and litigation work in tandem in 
advancing Aboriginal claims,86 and it is clear that the Government of Canada 
has often been moved from intractable negotiation positions through Aboriginal 
victories in the courts.87 However, as long as the rights inquiry mandated by the 
Van der Peet test remains resolutely focused on establishing and characterizing 
events or activities prevailing hundreds of years ago at the expense of a dis-
course about the exercise of Aboriginal rights in the context of contemporary 
Canadian society, it will not provide a solid foundation for negotiations. A 
solution to this unfortunate state of affairs must be found. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE VAN DER PEET RIGHTS 
ANALYSIS 
On numerous occasions the Court has referred to section 35 of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 as providing the constitutional framework for reconciliation of 
the pre-existence of distinct Aboriginal societies occupying the land with 
Crown sovereignty.88 This is a just and reasonable reading of the constitutional 
provision and the spirit underlying that provision. In our respectful opinion, 
however, the Court has proceeded from this point to develop a concept of recon-
ciliation and a role for section 35 which is neither just or appropriate. 
What the Court has proceeded to do, in fact, is to fashion reconciliation with 
Crown sovereignty by defining and dissecting Aboriginal society virtually to 
                                                                                                                                                              
85 S. Imai, 2002 Annotated Indian Act and Aboriginal Constitutional Provisions (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2002) preface, at xliii-xliv. 
86 And this has been recognized by the courts: see for instance, Dumont v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 279; Montana Indian Band v. Canada, [1991] 2 F.C. 30, at 38-39 and 
Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 186. 
87 For instance, the decisions in Calder, [1973] S.C.R. 313; Sparrow, supra, note 81; and R. 
v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533 [hereinafter Marshall]. 
88 Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at para. 42. 
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the vanishing point in contemporary terms. Crown sovereignty, on the other 
hand, is assumed to evolve, flourish and reflect contemporary reality. 
We suggest that there is a better and a fairer way and that this better and 
fairer way is found in the Court’s first judgment on the scope of section 35(1) 
— R. v. Sparrow.89 The twin ideas which the Chief Justice and La Forest J. 
appeared to be announcing in their reasons in Sparrow were, first, that on the 
matter of the existence and scope of Aboriginal rights, section 35 implied an 
accommodation by sovereign claims, not an accommodation towards such 
claims; and, second, that legitimate sovereign concerns were to be accommo-
dated with respect to the exercise of Aboriginal rights, not through denying 
those rights. How else can we read the portion of the reasons of the Chief Jus-
tice and La Forest J. commencing at page 1102 in which they examine the 
background of section 35(1)? In this portion of their reasons they commence by 
juxtaposing early British policy towards the “Native” population based on 
respect for the right to occupy their traditional lands as evidenced by the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 with the fact that from the outset there had never been 
any doubt that sovereignty and legislative power to such lands vested in the 
Crown.90 They then proceed to observe that: “For many years, the rights of the 
Indians to their aboriginal lands — certainly as legal rights — were virtually 
ignored.”91 Then they trace what they characterize as the “long and difficult 
struggle in both the political forum and the courts for the constitutional recogni-
tion of aboriginal rights”.92 They find that section 35(1) represents the “culmi-
nation” of this struggle. And they quote Professor Lyon who suggests that 
section 35 “calls for a just settlement for aboriginal peoples” and implies the 
end of “the old rules of the game under which the Crown established courts of 
law and denied those courts the authority to question sovereign claims made by 
the Crown”.93 The placement of this passage by Professor Lyon in the reasons 
in Sparrow surely can be construed as an acceptance by the Court that the just 
settlement for Aboriginal peoples and the reconciliation mandated by section 
35 implied for Aboriginal societies, not death by a thousand definitions, but 
rather room to grow. 
                                                                                                                                                              
89 Sparrow, supra, note 81, at 1082, 1083 where the Chief Justice and La Forest J. opened 
their reasons as follows: 
This appeal requires this Court to explore for the first time the scope of s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, and to indicate its strength as a promise to the aboriginal peoples of 
Canada. 
90 Ibid., at 1103. 
91 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
92 Ibid., at 1105. 
93 Ibid., at 1106. 
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This is borne out by the Court in Sparrow supporting the position of Hall J. 
in Calder rather than Judson J. on the matter of the vulnerability of Aboriginal 
rights to Crown power even prior to the enactment of section 35. The Chief 
Justice and La Forest J. stated: 
...That in Judson J.’s view was what had occurred in Calder, supra, where, as he 
saw it, a series of statutes evinced a unity of intention to exercise a sovereignty in-
consistent with any conflicting interest, including aboriginal title. But Hall J. in that 
case stated (at p. 404) that “the onus of proving that the Sovereign intended to ex-
tinguish the Indian title lies on the respondent and that intention must be ‘clear and 
plain’”. The test of extinguishment to be adopted, in our opinion, is that the Sover-
eign’s intention must be clear and plain if it is to extinguish an aboriginal right.94 
At the same time, the Court in Sparrow provided the tools for the ongoing 
reconciliation of Crown power with Crown duty and that was to suggest that, 
with justification, the exercise of Aboriginal rights could be restrained through 
government regulation.95  
The Supreme Court of Canada’s first judgment on the origins and nature of 
Indian title — and, by extension, all Aboriginal rights — was its judgment in 
Calder in 1973. Six judges of the Court rejected the argument that upon the 
“discovery” of North America by Europeans, all rights of the indigenous in-
habitants were promptly extinguished or superseded. While three members of 
the Court found that Indian title was subsequently extinguished by colonial 
legislation, six members of the seven member bench held that Aboriginal, or 
Indian, title was a pre-existing right which was not created by any colonial act. 
What was significant was the fact of prior occupation, the fact in Judson J.’s 
words that: “...when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in 
societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries.”96 
It is interesting that a reader of Lamer C.J.’s reasons in Van der Peet would 
form an impression from the opening passages that the Chief Justice was 
headed in the direction of Calder in his discussion as to what “Aboriginal” 
meant in Aboriginal rights. For example, the Chief Justice wrote: 
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and af-
firmed by s. 35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North 
America, aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, 
and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this 
fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples from all 
                                                                                                                                                              
94 Ibid., at 1098-1099 (emphasis added). 
95 Ibid., at 1109. 
96 Calder, supra, note 87, at 328. Three other judges, led by Hall J. found that the colonial 
legislation in question had not had the effect of extinguishing Aboriginal title. In Sparrow, supra, 
note 81, Hall’s judgment on extinguishment was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, 
and now constitutional, status.97 
In fact, the Chief Justice in Van der Peet specifically acknowledged the con-
tribution of Judson J. and Hall J. in Calder in this analysis and explained that 
no distinction needed to be made between determining Aboriginal title as in 
Calder and determining Aboriginal rights: 
The position of Judson and Hall JJ. on the basis for aboriginal title is applicable 
to the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Aboriginal title is the 
aspect of aboriginal rights related specifically to aboriginal claims to land; it is the 
way in which the common law recognizes aboriginal land rights. As such, the ex-
planation of the basis of aboriginal title in Calder, supra, can be applied equally to 
the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1). Both aboriginal title and 
aboriginal rights arise from the existence of distinctive aboriginal communities oc-
cupying “the land as their forefathers had done for centuries” (p. 328).98 
The Chief Justice in the early portion of his reasons in Van der Peet also 
seems to consider important the dynamic character to Aboriginal rights. He 
cites Professor Mark Walters as suggesting that the essence of Aboriginal rights 
is their bridging of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal cultures: 
The challenge of defining aboriginal rights stems from the fact that they are 
rights peculiar to the meeting of two vastly dissimilar legal cultures; consequently 
there will always be a question about which legal culture is to provide the vantage 
point from which rights are to be defined . . . . a morally and politically defensible 
conception of aboriginal rights will incorporate both legal perspectives.99 
Immediately following this passage, the Chief Justice invokes Professor 
Slattery and his suggestion that the law of Aboriginal rights: “is a form of 
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the various 
communities”.100 
The Chief Justice sums up his review of Canadian, American and Australian 
jurisprudence and the doctrine as follows: 
The Canadian, American and Australian jurisprudence thus supports the basic 
proposition put forward at the beginning of this section: the aboriginal rights rec-
ognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) are best understood as, first, the means by which 
the Constitution recognizes the fact that prior to the arrival of Europeans in North 
America the land was already occupied by distinctive aboriginal societies, and as, 
second, the means by which that prior occupation is reconciled with the assertion of 
                                                                                                                                                              
97 Van der Peet, supra, note 88, at para. 30. 
98 Ibid., at para. 33. 
99 Ibid., at para. 42. 
100 Ibid. 
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Crown sovereignty over Canadian territory. The content of aboriginal rights must 
be directed at fulfilling both of these purposes; the next section of the judgment, as 
well as that which follows it, will attempt to accomplish this task.101 
We do not take issue with the two elements identified. In fact, they contain 
the seeds of what we would consider to be a more appropriate approach which 
acknowledges the constitutional recognition of pre-existing Aboriginal societies 
and which leaves open the possibility of achieving reconciliation through ap-
propriate exercise of rights rather than through dissecting cultures to establish 
the existence of rights. The Supreme Court in Sparrow suggested the appropriate 
tool over 10 years ago — the justification test. 
Unfortunately, after this introduction, the Chief Justice moved immediately 
to establish a test now known as the Van der Peet test which effectively retreats 
from the Court’s approach in Calder and Sparrow by requiring Aboriginal 
claimants to prove, amongst other things, (1) that when the settlers came they 
were indeed living on the land; (2) the nature of their distinctive societies which 
existed when the settlers came; (3) those elements that were “integral” to their 
distinctive societies when the settlers came, (4) the manner in which they occu-
pied the land when the settlers came; and (5) continuity between the historical 
practices and the contemporary claims. 
In Delgamuukw, the Chief Justice determined that a continuing substantial 
connection between a people and a territory was sufficient to establish Aborigi-
nal title. Why is it not so that the continued existence of a culture, societal 
values and activities are not sufficient to establish Aboriginal rights? Why is it 
that the judicial recognition of the evolving nature of territorial occupation 
between the time of sovereignty and the present in the case of Aboriginal title is 
not applied to the individual Aboriginal activities not directly associated with 
the use and enjoyment of land title?102 We note that in Van der Peet, 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. adopted just such an approach for Aboriginal rights in her 
dissenting reasons.103 
                                                                                                                                                              
101 Ibid., at para. 43. 
102 The Chief Justice in Delgamuukw, supra, note 86, wrote, at para. 154: 
I should also note that there is a strong possibility that the precise nature of occupation 
will have changed between the time of sovereignty and the present. I would like to make it 
clear that the fact that the nature of occupation has changed would not ordinarily preclude a 
claim for aboriginal title, as long as a substantial connection between the people and the 
land is maintained. 
103 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in Van der Peet, supra, note 18, at para. 113: 
Aboriginal people’s occupation and use of North American territory was not static, 
nor, as a general principle, should be the aboriginal rights flowing from it. Natives migrated 
in response to events such as war, epidemic, famine, dwindling game reserves, etc. Aborig-
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We propose a return to the first principles originally articulated by John 
Marshall C.J. of the United States Supreme Court in the foundational trilogy of 
Johnson, Cherokee Nation and Worcester,104 first principles also set out in 
Calder by the Supreme Court of Canada and indeed invoked by Lamer C.J. as 
well as the present Chief Justice and L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Van der Peet.105 
These first principles include the existence of self-governing and independent 
nations or peoples occupying or using determined geographical areas which 
later became the subject of European sovereign assertions. These European 
sovereign assertions should not become the lens through which to examine the 
existence or continuation of the rights and titles of these pre-existing nations or 
peoples106 rather the focus should turn to establishing accommodation and 
reconciliation in the continuing existence and evolution of these societies. Here 
the Sparrow analysis and its emphasis on the exercise rather than the existence 
of rights would serve well.  
We note that the justification analysis of the Sparrow test has been elabo-
rated in theory in three Supreme Court judgments: in Sparrow107 the Court set 
out the justification test in cases involving sustenance rights and other Aborigi-
nal rights that are internally limited; in Gladstone108 the Court set out a separate 
                                                                                                                                                              
inal practices, traditions and customs also changed and evolved, including the utilisation of 
the land, methods of hunting and fishing, trade of goods between tribes, and so on.  
104 Johnson v. M’intosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); 
and Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832).  
105 See Lamer C.J., supra, notes 97-101, McLachlin C.J., supra, notes 18, 19, 20 and 
L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting reasons in Van der Peet, supra, note 88, at paras. 106, 107: 
Accordingly, it is fair to say that prior to the first contact with the Europeans, the native 
people of North America were independent nations, occupying and controlling their own 
territories, with a distinctive culture and their own practices, traditions and customs. 
In that regard, it is useful to acknowledge the findings of Marshall C.J. of the United 
States Supreme Court in the so-called trilogy, comprised of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 
Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester 
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Particularly in Worcester, Marshall C.J.’s general 
description of aboriginal societies in North America is apropos (at pp. 542-43): 
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, 
divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest of the world, 
having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own laws. 
[Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also referred in this context to Judson J.’s judgment in Cal-
der, supra, notes 12 and 13, see also page 245 of this volume. This passage was also quot-
ed, with approval, by Hall J. in Calder, supra, note 12, at 383. ]  
106 See Justice L’Heureux-Dubé dissenting in Van der Peet, supra, note 88, at para. 162: 
Finally, it is almost trite to say that what constitutes a practice, tradition or custom distinc-
tive to native culture and society must be examined through the eyes of aboriginal people, 
not through those of the non-native majority or the distorting lens of existing regulations. 
107 Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1115-1116. 
108 Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at paras. 56-75. 
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justification test for trading rights and those that are not internally limited; and, 
in Delgamuukw109 the Court set out a justification test for interference with 
Aboriginal title.  
Ironically, the justification test has received little more than theoretical 
treatment by the Supreme Court as the Crown very rarely attempts to justify 
interference with an Aboriginal right at trial, preferring to argue that the right 
was not established, that it was extinguished and, as in Mitchell, that it is “in-
consistent with Crown sovereignty.”110 
As we have seen, the seeds of a solution lie buried in the jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court of Canada — in Calder, in Sparrow, in Van der Peet, in Del-
gamuukw.111 
A distillation of the appropriate principles found in this jurisprudence, 
whether in majority, minority or dissenting reasons, indicates a way forward. 
No a priori assumptions about “Indianness” ought to apply to defeat an Abo-
riginal claim. Consistent with the recognition in Calder of the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal societies as self-governing, self-sufficient entities, the evidentiary 
burden relating to the historical existence of a right should be applied with 
reference to the general characteristics of the relevant Aboriginal society, not 
the specificity or particularity of discrete activities. Thus, a claim of an Abo-
riginal right to trade in salmon would be determined by whether, in pre-contact 
times, the Aboriginal society in question engaged in trade in the products of 
harvesting generally and whether this activity was meaningful to them. Or, 
using Mitchell as an example, the evidentiary burden would be met by estab-
lishing that the Mohawks historically travelled in a determined geographical 
area, engaged in diplomacy and trade with other First Nations and that these 
activities constituted meaningful components of their society.112 
Aboriginal plaintiffs would still have to establish that a Canadian law or 
regulation interfered with their Aboriginal right as prescribed by Sparrow. This 
having been done, the burden of proof would then switch to the government to 
establish extinguishment or, if that could not be shown, then to establish, on the 
basis of evidence, justification for the limitation of the exercise of the right. 
                                                                                                                                                              
109 Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 160-169. 
110 In addition to Mitchell, see R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 and Marshall, [1999] 3 
S.C.R. 533, for examples where the Court noted that the federal Crown failed to lead evidence on 
justification. Interestingly, provincial Crowns have led such evidence, but only occasionally have 
successfully demonstrated that a limitation is justified: see also R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101; 
Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139. 
111 And elsewhere. See for example, Lambert J.A.’s reasons in Van der Peet in the Court of 
Appeal for British Columbia, [1993] 4 C.N.L.R. 221, at paras. 137-151. 
112 It appears that the Supreme Court was satisfied that general evidence of trade with other 
First Nations, and its importance to the Mohawks, existed in this case: see para. 41 of its judgment. 
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Thus, if the Crown could show on the evidence that an Aboriginal right to trade 
in salmon would result in unacceptable conservation risks to the species, then 
the right would not be exercisable.  
We propose that, consistent with the federal government’s stated policy of 
preferring to focus on reaching practical and workable agreements on how 
Aboriginal rights will be exercised, the Sparrow inquiry should refocus onto 
questions regarding the exercise of the Aboriginal right in the context of con-
temporary Canadian society. This would result in a more equal evidentiary 
burden for the parties when they enter into litigation, and, more importantly, it 
would focus the inquiry before the courts on questions that are truly meaningful 
and relevant to contemporary Canadian, and Aboriginal societies. 
In this new universe, the Courts could cease patrolling cultural borders and 
concentrate on applying the law towards reconciling and ensuring the co-
existence and collaboration of proud, evolving and interdependent cultures and 
societies across those borders. 
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